We are beginning to understand, on a scientific basis, the fundamentals of group behavior -- and this new understanding has implications for the law of cyberspace. This month's Scientific American includes a fascinating article on "the Dynamics of Social Dilemmas" -- a study of cooperation featuring the example of a group that has agreed to split the meal check evenly and then must decide, individually, whether to order lobster or hot dog. The bottom line: collaboration occurs in groups that are small, last a long time, and know a lot about each other.
At a glance, this finding seems a disaster for the prospect of civilization in cyberspace, where communications span the globe, clusters of online citizens meet only sporadically and for brief periods, and the malleable nature of the medium can cloak much of the information about others online. How can Counsel Connect, for example, hope to foster collegiality in the legal profession's electronic guildhall if the scientists are right? Won't the participants in transitory, impersonal communications across large groups engage in "free riding", spoofing and exploitation -- and subject us, collectively, to a tragedy of the electronic commons?
To the contrary, it turns out that electronic communications foster just the type of trust and collaboration the scientists predict for small, stable and personable groups -- they give rise to community -- IF certain ground rules apply. If users are allowed to form separate areas of the system, then even large systems appear, functionally, to consist of much smaller groups of "regulars." The local pub (or cracker barrel, as some would say) emerges naturally. If users are required to communicate under their own identity, then there is less temptation to exploit others or abuse trust. Particularly in the context of a professional communications network, the participants behave responsibly (even thoughtfully) because they have to expect to continue to be found at the same electronic address throughout their professional careers. And, over time, even this text-based medium is rich enough to convey as sense of personal acquaintance with those we have never met face to face. Repeated selfless contributions to the community will be remembered and can be rewarded over time by the group -- and antisocial conduct can be punished.
If the electronic network creates new, tightly integrated social groups capable of eliciting collaboration and punishing defection, then these groups may exercise more powerful social control than those that apply in the "real" world -- and there may be less need for a more formal type of "law" in cyberspace. Everyone knows that complex contracts count for less when parties must deal repeatedly with each other and become highly interdependent. The US has more lawyers than any other country, the theory goes, because we are so much less integrated as a social group than the homogeneous cultures of other countries. As we all move our commercial transactions to "EDI" (electronic data interchange) and portions of our cultural and social lives become electronic, perhaps we will all live in more homogeneous online cultures and the need for lawyers will decline. There might be a need for protection of the rights of individuals against such groups -- but diversity coupled with freedom to find a group compatible with each individual's values may even make such formal rights less necessary. The real conflicts in cyberspace seem more likely to occur between groups, across social boundaries.
Presumably, the scientists' findings apply to interactions between groups as well. We can expect collaboration to arise between distinct cyberspace cultures that must deal with each other on a continuing basis. The optimal conditions can be approximated IF the system operators can effectively speak for their members and control their members' activities. I predict that we will see the rise of compacts between SYSOPs regarding such matters as accurate labelling of files, enforcement of rules privacy, and system security. To some degree, the global Internet is already based on an informal set of such agreements. But any such agreements will require the collaborating systems to be able to enforce their own local rules locally -- and that implies an ability to identify (and discipline) anyone who deviates from such rules.
The ultimate implication, I believe, is that to achieve a civilized form of cyberspace, we have to limit the use of anonymous communications. Many early citizens of cyberspace will bitterly oppose any such development, arguing that anonymous and pseudonymous electronic communications are vital to preserve electronic freedoms and allow free expression of human personality. But the problem with that view is that we all collectively face the diners' dilemma -- we must collaborate in groups to build a rich social fabric, and we know that the ability to act anonymously, sporadically, in large groups brings out the worst in human character. One thing is clear: the architecture of the network will have a profound impact on the nature of the societies that form there. Now that we know what's at stake, it's time for the sysops who control key policies (such as those associated with the identity and identifiability of participants) to build in the structures that hold the greatest potential for altruism, collaboration and responsibility.